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Although Blaug (1995, p. 27) has called the quantity theory 'the oldest surviving theory in 
economics' many. perhaps most economists believe that the monetarist counter-revolution has 
run its course: that Friedman's attempt to refurbish and revitalize the quantity theory has 
failed.  I  shall a.rgue that this view, while correct for a hard-core version of monetarism.  is  not 
correct for a sc~fter  version. But first to delimit what  I  mean by monetarism and will discusr.  I 
exclude from  ii- new classical theory. I ah  do not cover some broader aspects of Thatcherite 
policies, such as redu~ing  the power of unions or curbing the growth of the public sector. so 
that  I  am dealing only with issues of monetary theory and monetary policy.  I  relati.  it to 
~nainstrearn  Keynesian theory. such as fou~id  in modsr~l  ~nacroeconomic  textbooks. Perhaps 
such theory should 110t  be called  'Key~lzsiari'  any Ion~er.  but that is  a couvenient label. 
To she\\. that ~nucli  remains c)i' !l~c)tlerarisin  I  first sun~lnarize  its basic thc.ort.ricai i(Icit4 
~rnd  tllen cliscluc the esrenr to  wliich  [hey ha\,t. ps.sccl into ~ncldern  Keynesian ~lleory.  Theri. 
after looking brictly at inrerprrrations of the Great Depression.  I  do the same for issucs ot' 
rncmetary poliqf.  For reasons ot  space  I  focus on thc work of the three leading monetarisrs. 
Friedman. Brunner and Meltzer. and do nc~t  discuss the important work of others. such as 
Anderson, Cagan, Darby. Dewald.  Hetzel, Jordan, Laidler. Poole and Rasche. 
At first glance the evidence for the demise of monetarism seems overwhelming.  Few 
articles on monetarism appear in  the professional journals, and monetarism is no longer a 
popular topic for conferences. Just as telling is that nowadays few, if any of those starting on 
their careers as economists declare themselves to oe monetarists. Economists who do call 
themselves monetarists are nearly all older, and many are close to the end of their careers.  It 
would not be surprising if  by the year 2016, that is sixty years after Friedman (1956) launched 
the monetarist counter-revolution, there are virtually no active monetarists left. But that does 
not mean much - ideas can live on even when their labels no longer do. 
What has happened is that much of rnoderxe monetarist doctrine has been absorbed into 
{.he mainstream, and hence is  no longer credited to monetarism. We have here a Hegelian  process of the:;is, antithesis, and synthesis. Hence. if  Keynesian theory is  credited  with victory 
it is  in  good part because it was the more flexible, willing to absorb the best that the oppositiolt 
had to offer. F'erhaps this greater openness to alien ideas resulted primarily from  unfolding 
 events in  the 1960s and 1970s pointing in  the monetarist direction, or perhaps it was merely 
(due to an accident of  personalities, the leading Keynesians being more t-lexible in  their thinking 
:han the leading monetarists. It  might also be due to Friedman's model being. as explained 
below, a special case of the Keynesian model. and it being easier to 'work down' from a 
general  model to the specific one than the other way round. On  these issues one can only 
speculate. 
If  modern mainstream  Keyliesiarl theory embodies many ideas thar  morietarists had 
earlicr advcxxted. does that necessarily mean that monetarists should be  gi\,en creclir'l l'erl~api 
11ie1r  arguments were inet'fecti\re, anti mainsrreanl macroeconomlsts  were  int'luenceci not  t,! 
11lern.  but  0111y by cmcrging kicts? tiisrorians do 110t  crcdit the ('liartists  \\,irh ge~ici-:iiiny  r~l;iio~. 
chan:;cs  ill [lie British political systcln. t.\.cil tho~igll  :ill  but 011e  of thcir denlands ha\c \II~LY 
1,ecome law. l'llere is  no \t.ay of coniparing the persuasive powers of monetarist  argulwllt\ alitl 
of  emerging facts. But  it seems plausible that both played a part. And  e\  ;n  if it were true  rliiit 
~nonetarist  arguments played only a minor part.  monetarists should at least be given credit tor 
having pointed in  the right direction. Moreover. one might argue that something may remain 
~^rorn  the monetarist counter-revolution. even  if  it is  not here becarlse of  the monetarist 
counter-revolution. 
If monetarism lives on in  Keynesian theory does it also live on in another macroeco- 
nomic school, new classical theory:'  Monetarism did influence this theory. Its early version. 
Lucas's island model'. dealt with the response of the economy to a money supply shock. But 
:monetarism has less in  common with the more mature new classicism of real business cycle 
~:heory  than it  has with Keynesian theory (Laidler, 1992); a change in  the money supply  is  one 
~ot'  the variables generating income changes in  the General Theon:, but not in  real business 
cycles theory. Moreover, Friedman is a Marshallian, not a Walrasian (see Hirsch and de 
Machi, 1990). He puts more stress on empirical evidence than the new classicals do, and  while both he and  Lucas advocate a stable growth rate of money. they do so for very different 
7  r.easons.  - 
Friedman's Monetary Theory 
'There  are two major versions of monetarist theory. The better known Friedmanian version is  a 
refurbished form of the traditional quantity theory, in  which changes in  nominal income are 
explained by changes in  the supply and demand for money. This version of the quantity 
theory, unlike the old-fashioned version, does not take the demand for money to be 
rlumerically stable.  Instead, it  takes the demand for money to be a stable function of a limited 
number of predictable variables, such as real  income and the opportunity cost of  holding 
money. Friedman then adds to this money clernand function the hypothesis that the ohser\.i.tl 
changes  in nominal  income are due predominantly to changes in the supply of nomirial  111011e!. 
riot  to change5 in clema~id.  'I'his  is. of course. ali empirical claim \\)hose  validii;  ciependi.  iri 
~~nrninal  income could  be due to changes  in the money supply 
One can think of  Friedman's theory as a special case of Keynesian theory. The latter 
looks at income as determined by  the marginal propensity  to consume. the marginal efficiency 
of  investment, the demand for money (liquidity preference) and the supply of  money. 
Friedman treats this as unnecessarily complicated, and as distracting attention from what is 
central. Since money holdings correspond to the difference between receipts and expenditures 
one can determine expenditures by  looking at the excess supply or demand for money, that is 
at just two of the Keynesian variables, liquidity preference and the supply of money. This is  a 
good research strategy if  the demand for money is  a stable function of a few measurable 
variables. 
Don Patinkin (1  969, 1972) has argued that Friedman's theory is  not a genuine quantity 
theory, but is ii  Keynesian theory  in disguise. One reason is that. Friedman like Keynes, but 
unlike the traditional quantity theorists, uses portfolio analysis to explain the demand for money. Second, like Keynes, he formulates his analysis in  terms of stocks and  not in  term of 
flows. 
Patinkin's argument is  not persuasive. First, an important function of theories (or 
paradigms) is  1.0  generate research strategies, and Friedman's research strategy differs sharply 
from Keynes's. Keynes treated expenditures as determmed primarily by  incentives to spend. 
while Friedman, like traditional quantity tkorists, treats expenditures as determined primarily 
by  r?oney holdings.  Hence, Keynesian theory directs attention to explaining the motives for 
consumption and investment, while Friedman's theory directs attention to the motives for 
holding money. Second, Patinkin's argument requires that one classify  theories by  the a~lalyric 
tools they use. and not by  their assumptions and conclusions. Friednian uses some Keynesian 
tools bur  rnakes rracjitional quantiry-theory assumptions. and thereby reaches c~uarititytlieor~ 
conclusions.  11-1 principle, the clioice between classifying theories by  their tools or by their 
i.~rlpirical  ass~~~npiions  is  a  nior-i. or  lcss arl-litrary matter of  cori\.zntion. Hut oni!  corlfusio~i  aii~! 
no  benefits ~\.vulcl  resulr  from abandoriing the bv  noLv standard procedure ot calling Fritxlilia~~ 
a quantity theorists and hence a  nlont:tarist. Instead. ow  can just say that Frietl~rian's  analysis 
3  tias bc~iefited  from Keynes's insights.  . 
That the essential disagreement between Keynes's and Friedman's theories is  empirical is 
shown by  the ability to use the conceptual  framework of one to generate, given the appropriate 
empirical data, the conclusions of the other. Suppose that (a) the marginal propensity to 
consume, the marginal efficiency of investment, the budget deficit and net exports, are all 
stable, and so is the liquidity preference function (which is also not highly interest elastic). and 
(b)  that there are substantial and erratic changes in  the money supply. A Keynesian, just like a 
monetarist, would then attribute most of the observed tluctuation of  income to changes in  the 
money supply. He would describe the process as follows: changes in the money supply shift 
the LM curve which then intersects  [he IS curve at a different point. so that income and 
interest rates change. For example, a leading exponent of Keynesian-type econometric-models 
models, Allen Sinai (1992, p. 1) wrote: 'Financial phenomena, ranging from crises to panics. 
1.0  failures of financial institutions. to credit crunches, to busts have been decisive in  virtually (every U.S. bu,siness downturn.' Conversely, suppose that the money supply is  very stable. bur 
that, say the marginal efficiency of  investment or the deficit increase sharply.  Someone usiny 
,a quantity theory  model would then agree with Keynesians that income will rise. She would 
say that the increase in  investment (or in the deficit) raises the interest rate, which induces the 
public to reduce its  money holdings. so that velocity rises. 
But one should not  therefore say that the difference between Keynesian and Friedman's 
theories is  'merely empirical', because there is  nothing 'mere' about empirical differences.  In 
,:he empirical sciences. as distinct from Icgical sciences, such as mathematics, differences 
;~bour  empirical rnagl~i~udec  are often the crux of  the matter.  Moreover, differences about 
~crnpirical  magnirudes generatt. differences  in research strategies. A  Keyrlesian is  more likcly 
Ilan  a monetarist to develop a  Iiypothcsis that esplairls the ~narginal  efficicnq of in\u~li~c.t~i. 
;ind a  monetarist  is  more likely to work  (111  the clernarltl  for real  bala~iccs. 
'I'he relal.i\ c si~e  and t'requer~~,  ot  cl~angcs  in the money supply and  in such  KG ncL,tatr 
.,i~rial-)lej  a\ [hi:  !narginal efficiency of  rrl\esrmcllt :ir?  nor  the only  empirical ~nagnirudeh  cll;ti 
I1i1\.t played a  role  in the monetarist debate. Armthc'r IS the Interest elasticity  of the  liquiclir! 
pretere~ice  curx (demand for money). In [.he extreme Keynesian case. where this elasricit!,  i\ 
~nfinire.  a case that Keynes himself did nol. endorse (Keynes. 1936. p. 207). changes  in the 
quantity of money have no effect on income. Conversely, in  the extreme quantity-theory case 
of a completely interest inelastic and wealtli-inelastic demand for money. changes in  the 
inierest rate. and hence changes in  the marginal efficiency of investment or in  the deficit have 
no effect on income. Indeed, at one time it seemed that the monetarist debate turned on the 
interest elasticity of the demand for money, because it seemed to many economists that 
Friedman had claimed that this elasticity  is zero. But that was mistaken. Friedman (1959) had 
argued only th.at one can explain the long-run demand for money without paying attention to 
the interest rate, but that is different from claiming that the elasticity  is   trivia^.^ 
Friedman does not deny that an increase in  the money supply lowers the interest rate. 
which then lowers velocity. Instead, his argument is  that an increase in  the nominal money 
supply raises prices. so that the real  money supply, and hence interest rates and velocity  return to their previous levels. (Friedman, 1972) Only in the short run. perhaps for a year and a half 
or two years, does an increase in  the mone:y supply lower interest rates and velocity. On  the 
other side Keynesians agree that - ultimately - an increase in the nominal money supply leaves 
tine  real  interesr, rate and the real money supply unaffected. but claim that the process takes 
much longer. Suppose the money supply increases at a time of substantial unemployment. 
Wages and prices then rise only little, and a substantial effect on wages and prices [nay not 
clccur until well  into the next expansion when unemployment has fallen to the natural rate. 
A  related issue is  the nature of the Phillips curve. It may seem hard to believe now, but 
at least until about 1968 the simple Phillips curve without a price expectations term seems to 
Ilaw I~een  considered adequate. Even  in 1970 Paul Samuelscm told beginning students that: 
'the measured Phillips curve represents sh11  terl)l r~lationsllips  which will shift in thc  Iollgcr 
run. . . . I  Mlucl~  unemployment long ~nainta.inecl.  may gradually shift the Phillips curx 
Il:t[~v;trds. But 5y the same reasoriiy continued low u~lemploynwn~  may sliit't  the short-tcrw 
F'liillips cur\.e rightwards.  '  (Saniuelson. 1970. pp. X  I  1 - 12, italics in original .) Nor a  ori or ti 
about expcctational effects. 1-ipst.? and Steiner (1!975  p. 833-4). after describing the I1ypotllesis 
that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical, say that this hypothesis 'is c~,-rently  the subject  01' 
rnajor debate al: both the theoretical and empirical level.' They list as one of points that seem 
agreed upon th4at  inflationary expectations have been revised upwards, and that  'the actual rate 
of inflation does tend  to accelerate as the expected rate accelerates'. so that one should be 
skeptical of claims that unemployment can be reduced to 'very low levels' with 'only a small 
and constant ra.te of intlation.' Taking only such a modest step in the direction of a vertical 
long-run Phillips curve is not surprising since the early empirical work on the expectations 
-augmented Phillips curve often found that the sum of the coefficients of  the lagged inflation 
rate (which wa.s then used as a measure of expected inflation) was significantly below unity. 
All this is a far cry from what we believe now. However, it would be unfair to give the 
entire credit for the discovery of the expectaticns-augmented  Phillips curve and its long-run 
implication to the monetarists.  Edward Phelps published his version of the vertical Phillips 
curve in the same year as Friedman did, and Robert Gordon, a leading Keynesian, has been the profession's leading researcher in the expectations-augmented  Phillips curve. Hence, even 
though monetarists have been more insistent on the verticality of the long-run Phillips curve. 
they deserve only partial credit for correcting the earlier mistaken view of the Phillips curve. 
But they certainly pushed the profession in  the right direction. 
Another difference between monetarists and Keynesians, but one that is  not fundamental 
is  that Keynesians describe the transmission process from money to income as the economy's 
response to changes in  relative yield,s, while Friedman does so as the response to a change in 
the quantity of money. But this difference does not involve a deep theoretical issue. Given the 
demand curve for money it is just a matter of wording whether one describes a movemenr 
alonir this detnand curve ill  terms of a change in the cost of holding money. or in ter~ns  of  rile 
amount of  money clei~~anded.  It doe  make a substantial difference on a prac~ical  le\,el \\,liere 
measurt.tnenr  problelns arise. Frictlmnn twlieves that the  measured  interest rates uscil  ill 
Kcylieciall riieory arc potc.ntially  ~.nisl~cli~-~~  because they cover a  irii~cll  too liarrow ceg~i-it.nr  01. 
the ~narket:  tor examplc. they esclucle the  i~nputed  rate firms use to decide hob. ~nucli  ol' [licir- 
earnings  tc)  rciri\est. Ke~.nesians  argue that the measurement of  money creates eL,en Lvorst' 
- 
problenis: is  the proper measure M-I. M-2 or h/~-'!.~. 
Brunner and Meltzer's Monetary Theory 
i  shall present Brunner and Meltzer's theory only briefly because it appears to have 
subsr.antially fewer adherents among monetarists than does Friedman's theory. That does not 
necessarily mean that it  is  inferior. Its lesser influence may be due to it being more complex 
and less easily accessible to someone brought up on the IS-LM model than is  Friedman's 
theory. or to Brunner and Meltzer lacking Friedman's extraordinary expository ski1  Is, or 
perhaps to Friedman teaching at Chicago where he had access to more top-notch graduate 
students than Brunner and Meltzer had.6.  It is not due to the Brunner-Meltzer model 
performing less well on empirical tests, because their model is intended as a way to organize 
one's thinking, and not as a model to be directly confronted with the data. For empirical work 
Brunner and Meltzer derive from it testable hypotheses more or less similar to Friedman's. 
Brunner and Meltzer provide a more developed and deeper model than Friedman does. and spend considerable effort on modeling the economy as a whole, instead of following 
Friedman and concentrating on the demand for money. An aspect of the Brunner-Meltzer 
model that has caused much confusion is that their theoretical model  itself does not point to the 
money supply as necessarily being the dominant variable. In principle,  it could show 
Keynesian variables as dominating. Brunner and Meltzer then point to their empirical work, 
such as demonstrations of stability of the mnney demand function, as showing that money does 
dominate. 
In  their model changes in  wealth al~d  in  the relative yields of asset play a prominent role. 
Tlie government budget constraint, too. has a prominent role. Equilibrium is  not  reached 
unless the budget is  balanced, because as long as there is a deficit the gu\>crlilnent  is  t'eeiling 
additiolial bonds or money into the public's portfolio. Such a  mcdel  i.4  enrirely consisten[ \\ it11 
K.eynt:sian  theory. And  since it 1s  log~caily  coherent any ciebare about  it Inus:  tcui  i)!l   ill^ 
e.;lt.nr  to wliicll  it focuses  OII i~itcr~sti~ig  \.ariill~lt\  ;111d 'cuts narure at  its jo~iil!;'.  in orlirr  ~ic,r.il\ 
cu ~iiatters  ot' scientific taste more rlia~i  of  irutli. tor esarnplr. unl ihe traditional  liey~wsiani; 
111odels.  tlie  Hr~~nner-Meltzer  modei takes tlie  lrlargiilal efficiency of in~.esttnent  to be srablc. 
tlcrc Brunner a.nd Meltrer are preru~nably  :relying on indirect et.idence: their fintliilg that 
tluctuat~ons  in  income are explicable by the behavior ot the growth rate of  money. so that  011 
reed not bother with  tluctuations in  the marginal efficiency of  investment. 7 
Two Critical  Issues for the Quantity Theory 
finy attempt to explain changes in  income by changes in  the money supply faces two major 
critical challenges. that velocity cannot be predicted accurately enough, and that the money 
supply is  not exogenous being itself a func1:ion of income. 
The direction of causality became a serious issue as Culbertson (1960), Brainard and 
"robin (1968) a.nd Tobin (1970) showed the dangers of inferring causality from the observation 
that the growth rate of money usually precledes  business cycle turning points. Friedman's 
(1970) response that the qualitative historical evidence for major cycles shows that money was 
causal, does not necessarily apply to the much more frequent minor cycles. More recent 
attempts to settle the issue by VAR techniques and Granger causality tests have been inconclusive. Nor can the issue by resolved by arguing that the central bank can, - if  it really 
wants to - control the quantity of money, because the issue is  how to interpret the observed 
correlation of money and income, This cc),.relation  could well have arisen at a time when the 
central bank was not determined to control the money supply. The causality question  i~ 
therefore an important unresolved  issue  in the monetarist debate. 
Another serious challenge to rnonetlirism came from the changed behavior of velocity.  111 
the 1960s and 1970s demand functions for money had often given good fits, and  M-l velocit~~ 
had  risen at a remarkably steady ratle eacb year, while M-2 velocity had  been stable. But 
already then there wei-c reasons for doubt. Even if a money demand function fitted to tiit' 
'7  It:ve3:i  of  the data achieves a  R-  of 0.97.  that does nor  suffice: a 3 per cent error  ill euplarrir~~g 
tile  le~e!  of  income is  much  too great. Moreo~.er.  the stabiiity of  velocity  was es~enrially  an 
ullexplained rcsult. there bcin~  IIO r(:asorl  ~vhy  tlic de~nand  function for any good  should hi. 
hiyhl> .;tat>le.  And  ir is  c!angcrous to  trust [hat xliicl~  I\Y  do iiot urlcltrsraiici. Prrhiip.\  rile 
<[ability  coulc! he esplrti~wl  by saqiilg rhar  r~io~lt'y  (0s  ;tr  IC;ISI  hl--  1 )  is  a11  aswt ~t'itliout  ciow 
subs~irutes.  bu~  that sort of  reasoni~ig  is  too loose to  inspire ~nucli  confidence. 
111 any case. li. S.  ~riolley  demand functions began to deteriorate  in the  1970s. Tile11  11-1 
the  1980s the trend of velocity changed sharply, and, even after allowing for a new trend. 
velocity became more erratic. Using that most powerful  tool of economic analysis. hindsight. 
one can say that this should not  have been surprising. since technological  innovations. such as 
wire transfers and falling costs of computations.  reduced the demand for money. Moreover. as 
restrictions on interest payments on money were relaxed, money holdings came to include 
more balances that were not needed for  irnmediaic transactions. and for such balances 
securities are good substitutes. (Monetarists, by  the way. had ardently advocated the removal 
of these restrictions.) Finding a measurable definition of money in  a world of rapid financial 
and technological  change is a serious problem for monetarism. 
Despite numerous attempts to improve money demand functions or to redefine money so 
that its demand function or velocity are stable. the quantity theory can no longer be used to 
predict income.  In the 1960s and  1970s the 'St. Louis equation' (developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) l~dd  received  much attention by showing that changes in  the money 
supply and in  fiscal policy predict income changes well, with money being by far the senior 
partner. By  the mid 1980s that was no longer so. As Benjamin Friedman (1988b, p. 59) 
pointed out: ''The double-digit average growth rate [of M-I]  maintained for five years 
following midi-1982 represents the most rap~d  sustained  money growth the United States has 
expcr~enced  since World War  11,  yet these same years also saw the strongest sustained 
deceleration of prices in the postwar period.' M-2 velocity remained stable until the 1990s. but 
then it, too, became erratic. 
Hence, as a lvay of predicting quart(-rly  or annual changes in  nominal  income the 
quantity theory seems useless.  Forecaster:;  do not  t'ollo~v  the Friedmanian rcsearch stratcgi of' 
looking al~nos~t  only at the supply and denland for money, but use  models deril-ed I'ro11.1  the 
IS-LM  And  it is  precisely for such practical and 'low-level' purposes as 
prediction. and not  for  sari(;t!~in~  the ~.isli  for inatlit.~~~aiical  sopl~isticaiion  and  in(t'~Iec~ual 
i.Icg;lncc that  111~'  qu;~~itit~.  ~licory  is  i~lic~l~i'd.  7'11~1~  ;I  mior part ot the nionrrarist rt.seari.11 
program hat! t:nded  i~i  t'allurr. 
Some Other Issues in rhe Monetarist  Debate 
tlseu.here (Mayer 1978).  1 characterized monetarist theory by the following five propositiotls 
in addition to the already discussed  predominance of monetary factors in  explaining nominal 
income. They are (I)  validity of a moneta.rist model of the transition process: (2) inherent 
stability of the private sector: (3) irrelevance of allocative detail for explaining short-run 
changes in  money income; and the related proposition that capital markets are fluid: (4)  the 
need  to focus on the price level as whole rather than on individual prices, and (5) that small 
econometric models are more reliable than large ones. To this should be added a general focus 
on longer run effects. 
All. bu~~  the first two of these need some clarification.  To understand the monetarist 
claim that the private sector is stable requires 2  definition of stability. One possible criterion. 
proposed by Brunner and Meltzer (1976), is  whether, if  the economy is shocked, it will  return 
to equilibrium on its own without government intervention. But this is not a good criterion because it specifies neither the time nor the intervening level of unemployment and  intlation.') 
Moreover. thi:s type of stability was accepted by many economists already before the 
monetarist counter-revolution. A better, though vague. criterion is  whether the economy 
returns to equilibrium within a reasonable time, without generating unacceptable levels of 
unemployment or intlation. An alternative. less vague criterion is to take the observed level of 
instability as the criterion. and to say that we should call the private sector unstable if  in  the 
absence of stabilization policy we would experience more instability than we do now. 
The two propositions about the irrelevance of allocative detail and the need to focus on 
the price level as a whole, are infrequently made explicit and now play a lesser role in  the 
tkbate than tky  did in  the  1970s. Some shocks, e.g.. a bad harvest. directly affect only a 
particular sector. Since rrionetarists focus on  equilibrium in  the money market they relid  to 
iyiiort: such specific shocks that do iiot  have a significant effect on the supply or demand lijr 
11-1011~!. Ktt!~tlt~sinn.s.  ~~.irli  rlieir  t'ucus  on rlic  ~nargitial  efficiency of iii\,csttnelit atid [lie 
propc1isity  to c:o~isuti~c  art. more syinparhr.tic to loohiiig at sxtorial effects.  Mo~ictnris~s 
also focus iln the price level  21s a \+.hole.  insrcad of on  wage and price deveiopnients  ill 
particular sectors. Suppose that OPEC raises nil prices by 10  per cent, and that (directly and 
indirectly) oil accounts for 10  percent of GDP. As afirst nppro.rimntiorz Keynesians ~vill  tend 
to say that the price level will  rise by one percent. while monetarists will say that it will  not 
rise since the money supply has not risen.  Keynesians were therefore much more hospitable to 
the cost-push explanations of  intlation that were popular at one time. 
In accordance with Keynes's (1924 p. 80) criticism of the quantity theory that:  'in the 
long run we are all dead'. Keynesians focused short run, disequilibrium situations, while 
monetarist focused on what happens once the economy is back in equilibrium. lo Thus Keynes 
paid little attention to the fact that in his theory. too, an increase in the money supply 
e\.lentuallv raises prices proportionately. 
Half Full or 14alf Empty? 
Although the difficulty of predicting velocity, and to a lesser extent the problem of 
determining the direction of causation, have severely damaged the hard core monetarist hypothesis that changes in the money supply provide a reliable way of predicting changes  in 
nominal income, a moderate version of monetarism has been much more successful.  If  one 
treats the monetarist counter-revolution as a protest against the deemphasis of changes in  the 
supply of money as explaining income changes, then monetarism has won. 
Despite the variability of  veloci~ty  the quantity theory is still correct in  claiming that a 
significant increase in the money suplply will raise nominal income significantly, and that 
money is  neutral in  the long run. These propositions may seem like platitudes that no 
economist would ever have denied. Blut  before the n~onetarist  counter-revolution  it was widely 
rejected. The standard argument was that the interest elasticity of demand for money is  high, 
wliile the interest elasticity of expenditures is  very lour.  so that eLren a substantial increase  111 
the moncy supply changes interest rates by  little, and aggregate demand by  cven leus.  111 rer1115 
of the equation of exchange. chatiges in  M  are al~iiost  entirely offset by changes  in V. 
that  tl~c  intcrcst cla~t~c~t!  or cleina~ld  lor  Illone? is  nloclcrate and the  liltereit elasilclr!  ot 
expe~~l~tures  1s  far trom  ~SIL  1x1. h.lort.o\er. ~~npertecrionu  of  the loan ~narket  can s~gnit~caurl! 
magnify the  impact of  monetary policy. 
It is  therefore not surprising thad  Alvin  Hansen (1957, p. 50). who was widely 
considered the leading  American Keynesian of his generation.  wrote: 
I  think we should do well  to elim~nate  once and for all. the phrase 'velocity 
of circulation' from our vocabulary.  Instead, we should simply speak of the 
ratio of money to aggregate spending. The phrase velocity of circulation is, I 
feel, unfortunate because those who employ it tend to make an independent 
entity out of  it and imbue it with a soul. The little manikin is placed on the 
stage, and the audience is  led to believe that it is endowed with the power of 
making decisions directing and controlling the tlow of aggregate spending. In 
fact it is  nothing of the sort. It is  a mere residual. We should get on much 
better if  we substitute the word 'ratio'. The little manikin would then be 
forced back into oblivion where it properly belongs. 
Similarly, in  Britain the Radcliff Committee stated: 
We have not made more use of this cmcept [velocity] because we cannot 
find any reason for supposing, or any experience in  monetary history 
indicating, that there is any limit to the velocity of circulation: it is a 
statistical concept that tells us  nothing directly of the motivation that 
influences the level of total demand. An analysis of liquidity on the other 
hand, directs attention to the behavior and decisions that do directly  intluence the level of total demand. (Committee on the Working of the Monetary 
System, 1959, p. 133) 
Not only were the effects of a given change in  the quantity of money treated as relatively 
minor. but economists also tended to stress the variability not of the money supply, but of the 
marginal efficiency of investment. Hence, it was in  the animal spirits of entrepreneurs. and nor 
in the limited ;and cautious actions of central bankers that they saw the origins of econoinic 
fluctuations. 
All that has changed radically, so that new-Keynesian economics, the most vibrant part 
of Keynesian economics, can according to two of its leading exponents 'also be called lien 
monetarist ecolnornics.' (hdankiw and Romer, 1991, p. 3) As hlankiw stated  in an intt.r~,ie\\,: 
a lot  of new Keynesian work is  trying 10  reformulate [lie Friedman-Tol,bill 
view of  the world. .  . .  I  think of myself as a Keynesian in  the sense ot 
believing that the business cycle represents some sort ot' marliet  impert'ectior 
on a grand scale. In that sellse  I  think of  mxlf  as Keynesian. Miltoil 
Friedman u,;is also a Key~iesian  in that sense. Mv own \,iews emerged as 
much  from lZlilton Friedman as they  have from jollli  hlay~iard  Keynes. . . .  I 
rhiiik  that the broad theme of rhc  (;etrer.ill 771eot:~  i5 that the business cycle is 
st)~ne~.lii~ig  n.e really need  rcj worry about . .  In that way  I  am a Kcynesiall. 
but  . . . so is  Milton  I:rictlma~l.  . . .  Most  ne\v Keynesian ~nodels  in;pol\.e  sornt: 
sort of natural rate: in that sense IViltor  Friednian has won the debate. . . .  111 
farr Keynes might not rccogni~e  the new  Keynesians as Keyiesians at all. 
(SnoLvdon and Vane, 1995. pp. 5 1. 53. 55. 57) 
Greewald and Stiglitz ( 1993. p.  23) list three propositions on which all Keynes~a~ls 
agree. One is  that money 'matters at least  mosr of the rltne. although monetary policy may be 
ineffective in  :some periods (like the Great Depression.)' 
Turning to the other issues in  the debate, the monetarist story of the transmission process 
has not made its mark. As already discussed, the Brunner-Meltzer version has few adherents. 
Friedman's general version (see Friedman and &hwartz,  1963b), too, has not made much of a 
contribution since it describes a process of asset substitution that differs little from the 
traditional story. Similarly, because of the failure of the small St. Louis model (the main 
monetarist econometric model) the monetarists' argument for small models has found little 
support. To be sure, distrust of econometric models in  general has been bolstered by  the Lucas 
critique, but the Lucas critique is  not part of monetarism. 
But three other propositions have fared better. It  is extraordinarily difficult to determine whether the private sector is  stable. To a considerable extent opinions on  this issue are matters 
of faith. (See Mayer.  1978.)'  But  ii is  easier to show that professional opinion has shifted  in 
a monetarist direction. This was illustrated when as leading a Keynesian as Modigliani wrote 
with respect to the monetarist contention that the economy's response to demand shocks is 
small and temporary. that: 'it must be acknowledged that every one of  the monetarists' 
criticism of early, simpleminded Key nesianism has proved  in considerable measure correct  . ' 
(Modigliani, 1977, p. 8) Although I cannot document this  I have the impression that on  issues 
of  the role of allocative detail in explaining,  changes in income, and on focusing on  the price 
le\,el as a whole. macroeconomists are now also considerably closer to the monetarist position 
than they  were. In particular, with  respect  LO  cost-push intlation professional opinion has 
rnovec.l  in the  monetarist direction. To be  sure. rlls oil shocks ot the  1970s have lnatle 
CC~I~OI~~S~S  more a\isart'  of supply sliocks. but there is  also a general  recognitio~l  that  in dlc 
IOII~  run such shocks call raise the pric? 1e~t.l  oilly  if' tnolletar!  policy \,alitlatci rhern. 
With  respect to a long-run \,ersm a sliorl-run focus ~nacroucoliornics  11ow  to  a  ~LIII~IA~~I~II 
cstent tc~llows  the  ~nclnctarists  ill paying much attention to  the  long  run. Growth  ~noclcl\ 
abound. 
The Great Depression 
As  Lawrence Summers (1991) has pointed out. despite what they claim, economists' thinking 
is  more  intluenced by  dramatic events than by  sophisticated econometric evidence. It is 
therefore not surprising that the Great. Depression had an  immense intluence on macroeconnm- 
ics. Before the publication of  Friedman and Schwartz's A Moneta~  History of the United 
States ( 1963a) the Great Depression was treated as an unequivocal refutation of  the quantity 
theory: without a significant change in the money supply the U.S. economy collapsed. and 
failed to revive despite an extraordinarily easy monetary policy. Hence, the quantity theory 
being unable to explain the most salie.nt macroeconomic event of  the century, must surely yield 
to Keynesian theory. 
Friedman and Schwartz reversed this story, arguing that monetary policy was highly 
restrictive during the Great Depression, so that it  illustrates the great importance of changes in the money supply. l2 Their work led to an extensive and still ongoing debate. The 
Friedman-Schwartz thesis has taken some hits; thus, their explanation of why banks failed paid 
insufficient attention to the poor quality of  bank assets, and their discussion of the effects of 
bank failures paid too little attention to the availability of loans to small firms. But their claim 
that monetary policy was restrictive appears to have found widespread acceptance. As a result 
of their work and related  work by Brunner and Meltzer the Great Depression is  now more 
likely to be cited as evidence for than against the quantity theory. 
Mlonetary Pol icy 
Monetarists have advanced six policy propositions: (i) the primary task of central banks is  10 
control inflation. not unemployment: (ii) central banks neccl  to  use an explicit and \ alidatccl 
t'rnmetvork  of targets and indicators:  (iii) ?he appropriate insrrumelltal  variable (proximte 
tarset) 1s  total  rcser\es: (I\) the central  bank can control the money supply w~rli  cutt~cie~li 
cicjllcjIIllctr that  rnigllr prefer ro  pcg  ?llc~r  eucllangc rare5): anti  (\ I) Inorley choulcl gron at \rablc 
or t~ucd  rate. I-'  On  all  but the f~rst  of  thew issues. ,tnd perhaps tllc tnurth (\\hose \aguent.s\ 
niakcs  it hard  to d~scuss)  monetarists appear to  1lai.e failed to persuade many economists and 
central bankers. But. as shown belmv. that  1s  more an apparent than a real failure. 
That central banks should focus on controlling intlation is  now widely though certainly 
not universally accepted by economists. This idea has also had practical impact.  European 
central banks now do not respond  to massive unemployment the way they would have done in 
the 1960s.  In some countries the law now requires the central bank to give priority to 
controlling intlation, and this will also be the law in  the EMU. In the U.S. the Fed has 
supported a failed attempt to impose such a law. 
Monetarists have had less but by no means negligible success on the targets and 
instruments issue. They have failed in the basic sense that the preferred procedure is  now GDP 
targeting. Since GDP targeting means to 'look at everything' that affects nominal GDP it is a 
negation of the monetarist recommendation to look only at a single target and a single 
instrumental variable. (See Mayer  1990, Ch. 9.) But even so, GDP targeting is a major i,mprovement over the focus on money market stability that was the target of so much 
monetarist criticism in  the 1960s and  1970s. 
Moreover, by criticizing the Fed's money market myopia, as well as its policy during 
the Great Depression,  monetarists have changed the way we view central banks. Before the 
mergence of monetarism the prevailing view, at least in  the United States, was that. while 
cetxral banks have little  influence over the economy, they use efficiently whatever powers the! 
do have.  Friedman and Schwartz and Brunner and Meltzer convinced  much of the profession 
that this is  not so. that the Fed  has often fumctimed procyclically, and thus along with 
unfolding experience, they destroyed  the myth of great central bank expertise and clispassic)nart~ 
crment.  ,I ud, 
Monetarists ha\.e not  been successful  in intluci~ig  central  banks to  use a  total  resene\ 
instr~r~ne~lt.  111 the  IJ.S.  they seen a\ first glallce to Iia\'e tail&  entirely since tile  Fed  ic 11ou 
as Ix!'orc usi~lg,  b~~rr~n~ccl  resenes aiid  a shor~-ter~ii  ~IIIC~CSI  rim a5 its  i~~strumc~ital  ~m-i:il~lcs.  '-I 
t3ut  [hi\ seemiry failure liiclcs snint. imporran[ partial 5ucccsses. First. \tliiie prior to  rlic xl\enr 
ot ~norictaricnl  the  Fed  used  these  t~\c., variables  in :; naive ~vay  it has learned tram  [he 
~nonerarists'  criticism and e~olving  experience to use them more efficiently.  It no\\, real irecl 
that  it' it keeps interest rates and borrowed  reserves stable when economic activity and hence 
the demand for money rise.  it is  following  not a neutral. but an expansionary  monetary policy. 
The real bills doctrine has lost its sway. 
The most discussed  issue in  the monetarist policy debate has been whether to use the 
growth rate of  the money supply as the target variable. The main issue here is whether changes 
in the money stock have a more predictable effect on nominal income than do changes in  some 
other controllable variable or set of variables. The monetarist position was badly damaged  in 
the 1980s and 1990s when the demand for money became less predictable. One might. of 
course. argue that even so, the money growth rate is still a better predictor of GDP growth 
than is  the short-term nominal interest rate that the central bank controls. But the case for this 
is  much weaker than it had seemed  in  say. 1975. Not surprisingly, many countries that had 
previous targeted money ceased to do so. Moreover in  recent years the Fed's policy has been remarkably successful. even though it has paid little attention to monetary targets. That has 
made  it hard to argue for such targets. 
The boldest monetarist policy proposal is  that the money supply should grow at a fixed 
rate ithe hard-core monetarist position), or at least a stable rate. 15.  Monetarists have argued 
against counter-cyclical policy on two grounds. First. given the  'long' and variable lag  in 
mont:tary  poiicy, as well as errors in forecasting GDP and  in predicting the strength of a given 
monetary-policy action, an intended counter-cyclical policy is  more likely to have pro-c).clical 
than counter-cyclical effects. 16. Sec~ond,  monetarists have challenged the supposition that 
central banks act are motivated entircly by the p~~blic  interest. They stress its self-interested 
behavior and its reliance on outrnod~d  ideas (See for  instance Friedman, 1982. Hrunner. 198  1) 
trieci man  (Modigliani and  Friedman.  1977) consitlers this political argument against 
discrcrionary policy to bc  at least as  imporrant ac rlitl argunlent from lags and forecast crrorj. 
111 rwent years this political argulnenr has  lm11  recnti)rceti hy all estcrlsi\e Iiteratiirc 011  tiiiic 
i~~cnnsistency.  It also gained support clue  to  t!ie  experience of  tile  1960s anti  !970i. \i,lieii 
ci~scretionary  mowtar!.  pol~cq.  albeir aided by supply sliocks. set nlany countries  UII~  the  1)iiih 
of unacceptable inflation (Cf. Darby. 199 1 ) 
These criticisnls of counrercyc:lical policy hax not  been answered effectively. (See 
Mayer, 1996.) Instead. the case for a fixed monetary growth rate rule has been undermined  t~y 
the shift in the trend of  velocity. Even  if the monetarists are right and the central bank cannot 
ccunteract cyclical fluctuations successfully, it can more or less successfully adjust the 
monetary growth rate for changes in  the trend of  velocity. And  it is  hard  to believe that 
self-interested behavior would prevent it from sooner or later doing so. The behavior of 
velocity in  the 1980s and 1990s ther'efore drew attention to the fact that skepticism about 
countercyclical policy does not necerssarily imply support for a fixed monetary growth rate 
rule. 
But  it is  possible to adjust the monetarist position to take account of changes in the trend 
of velocity by advocating, as for example Meltzer (1987) and McCallum (1988) have done. a 
feedback rule which adjusts the monetary growth rate for longer run changes in velocity. For example, one rule sets the growth rate of the monetary base equal to the target growth rate of 
nominal income minus the growth rate of velocity over the past four years plus an adjustment 
for misses of the growth rate of the base in  the last quarter. Such as rule does nor require the 
central bank to forecast the business cycle or to know the lag and strength of its policy. And  it 
does not allow the central bank to indulge in  self-interested  or politically motivated behavior. 
So it meets the concerns of the monetarists, and yet permits monetary policy to adjust - albeit 
with a lag - to long-run changes in velocity. 
Whether such a feedback rule would perform better than discretionary policy is  a debated 
issue, and crit:ics, such as Benjamin Friedrnan (1988a) and Franco Modiglialii (1988).  have 
ra~sed  serious questions. But so far at least. a monetary groivth rate rule  in the  form of a 
feedback  rule is  still an option that llas ro be taken seriously. 
Surwys of Economist's Opinions 
Tablt:  I  sliotis [he results ot' tour si~rn~y\  :hat con~ai~l  ti~,e  qucirio~is  rele~xnr  for tllc nionet;~r-i~! 
tlebatc. One the riw  l1.S. ur~~ys  u.as rahitn  in the heycia, of  tnorietarisnl  and the other- ai'rcr- 
]\/I-  1  \,elwit;  became u~istable.  Tl~eir  resu11.s  canndt be compared precisely both bccauw tlicir 
mnples may have differed. and because the sampling errors are not kno&n. All  the same. it is 
notable that they show only a small. if any shift away from monetarism. Indeed. on  the basic 
question whether inflation is  primarily a moneiary phenomenon monetarism appears to have 
gained support. And, surprisingly  it has, it' anything, gained rather than lost support also on 
the issue of stable monetary growth. On three other questions, it seems to have lost some 
support, though this is perhaps just a matter of sampling errors, and even if not, the indicated 
losses are small. The two other surveys do not allow one to compare shifts over time. but they 
do show that U.S.  economists are hardly the only supporters of monetarism. A British study 
that provides bar charts rather than percentages shows similar results (Ricketts and Shoesmith. 
1990). 
Conclusion 
In summary then, the strong monetarist position has not done well. It is possible that this will 
change, if  - and this is a big if  - the demand function for money again becomes predictable.  It is also possible that clumsy central bank policy will rekindle interest in  strong monetarist 
policies. That, too, does not seem likely. 
But  mainstream  economics has absorbed and profited from much of monetarist theory 
and policy analysis. The Keynesian-monetarist debate has therefore not been the waste of  time 
that  it might otherwise seem. This is  not to deny that the debate has had  its unsatisfactory 
aspects. In  the 1970s at least in  the U.S. the extensive debate about interest rate versus money 
stock targeting missed the important point that the Fed was not using the interest rate as a 
target variable that should be adjusted as the IS curve shifts, but instead was stabilizing the 
it:,terest rate. a policy inconsistent with both Keynesian and monetarist theory. Moren\.tlr. ill 
thc debate about a stable monetary growth-rate rule inonctarists made much stronger claims 
than their e\ itlence justified. while Keynesians paid essentially  no attention to  the seriou~ 
points their opponents \\.ere making (see hslaycr.  1996). Rut it is  far froin ot)\'ious that  tht' 
nionet;lrist tlelxite  in\~ol\~etl  nlore conf~.ision  and ua5:e  tlian 1iia11y  other c!ebarcs  in ecoiioriiic>. 
M'c. rnusF accept the  tac,~  that dey~~rc.  much  iiiathemar~cal  razzle-da~rlc  progress  ill ccorioniicg  I\ 
SII,)L\,. ENDNOTES 
1.  Can one ar  7~;:  instead (along Lakatosian lines) thar nionetarisni is dead because the nionetarist  research 
program is m&sger generating new and startling discoveries? To be sure, nionetarists are still doing valuable 
work, but most of  it, such as the explanation of central bank secrecy, is peripheral to the central concerns of 
monetarism. Suc!h an argument is unpersuasive. That a research program is not making much additiilnal progress 
does not mean that its previous discoveries are now invalid. Mechanics is hardly the cutting edge of physics. hu. 
engineers still find it useful. 
2. Frirdn~an  doe:; so hecause he believes that central barks lack both the knowledge and the niotivation required 
for effective stabilization  olicy  By contrast. Lucas believes that stabilization pol~cy  is not needed shce  the 
private sector llar e~s)ugh%~lo~ird~e  to adjusts on it.  own. 
3.  Friehian (1  969. p. 73) has d,escribed the developnient of his version of tlie quantity theory as follows: 'A 
more fundamental and more bas15 development in monetary theory has been the, refommulation of the quantit> 
theory of nioney in a way much influenced  by the Keynesian liquidity analysis. 
,4. Suh.sequent work by  Meltzer (1963) arid Laidler (1966)  showed that the i~~rerest  rate .sh~uld  be included e~t.11  ill 
long-nm money tlemand functions. 
10. Friedn~an  (1972) has criticized Keynesian f(lr lookins only at the first round effect of a change in the moncq 
stock. while hfodigliani  ( 1977., p. 20) has (with .some exaggeration) equated molletarlsnl  wirh a  'non-111owt:irixr 
world in which lags disappear. 
I  I. Since it is an issue that is ce~!tral  to one's beijef about how thr economy functions it js  sin~ilar  to what L+katoh 
calls a metaphysical core propos~tion.  However.  ~t  has been treated as a testable proposltlon by most cconomsts. 
12. Clark Warburton (n.d.) had previously made the same argument, but in a less effective way. 
13. Instrumental variables. alsc? called proximate targets. are variables that are used as low-level targets (that ir 
targets that are in close  roxmit  to the Fed's tools) to attain a Ii~gher-level  target. For example. the nlont.  mck 
is a high level target ant  the ~ednmay  use the federal funds rate or borrowed reserves as instrunleotal variaKics to 
generate the growth rate of the money stock it desires. 
14. Borrowed resemFs are a very different instruniental variable from total reseyves.  Su pose the IS curve sllifts 
outward aud ~narhrt  Interest rates rise. The central bank's lending rate has not risen. so!anks  borrow !nore from 
it. If the central bank has a borrowed reserves target it then undertakes open market purchases to sat~sty  the 
cleniand for resrwes, and thus bring borrowed reserves back to the desired level. By  contrast, if it-has a total 
reserves target it undertakes open market sales to offset the increase in borrowed reserves. In the, t~rst  case it 
accommodates the deniand for reserves, in the second case it does not. The fomier 1s preferable ~t the ~ncreased 
cleniand for resemes resulted from a shift in the luoney demand hnctiun, and the latter is preferable if it resulted 
troni an undesired rise in tionli~lal  inconir. In tlie U.S. the controllability of the nioney supply through reserves. 
as the nr)netarists advocate. has probably also deteriorated for two reasons. First.  the reserve rey,ire~lient  all ti~i~e 
deposits has been abolished. Second. the reserve requiren~ent  on checkable deposits is no longer  ~nd~ng  tor a 
I-lumber of banks .wl~ose  vault cash. augmented by the need to hold currenc  in autoniatic teller machines. i.;  large 
cnough to meet the roerve rcquirenlcnt. Whether that creates a serious proi~eni  is hard to say because there liar heen much debatt about whether a binding reserve requlremrnt make\ actual rewve holdings all [hat niuch niore 
pred~ctable. 
15. Although it is advocacy of a fixed rather than 'ust a stable growth rate of money that is often taken to he basic 
In nlonetansnl, that is not correct. Friedman (1984.  ip.  3-41 is willing to accept as a munetanst soaa)ne  who 
believes that the rnoney growth rate should be 'steady and predictable , though it may vary in accordance with 
:;()me rule. but 1s not rlgldly fixed. Brunner and Meltzer, too, have never ~ns~sted,  on a fixed money growth ratc: 
in fact Meltzer ad.vocates a feedback rule for money growth. 
16.  I have  ut 'long' in quotation marks because Friedman's estimate of the lag, while long relative to what 
, 
xen~ed  to & wihly believed at the time, is not long when ompared to the lags now shown by  loost ewno~iiet,r~c 
~nodels.  Friednlan (1953) showed that, given his lag. plausible estinlates ,of the .relevant variances could result  111 
policj;.bejng proc-cyclical. But lie never presented any systematic, en~p~ncal  erldn~ce  that policy is actually 
tlesta  ~lizlng.  Neither did Keynesia~q  present any evidence to the c,ontrary. (Sze.Mayer, 1996.) Concern that due 
ro  lags pol~cy  nwy well be destablhzmg IS not confined to monetarists (see Ph~ll~ps,  1957). Table 1 
Economists's  Views on Monetary Economics 
A. -  U.S. 
Surlrey  published in  :  1979 
A  B 
Percent 
1.  Inflation is 
primarily a monetary 
phenomenon  27  70 
2. Fiscal policy has 
a significant 
stimulative impact 
in a less than fully- 
employed economy 
3.  The money supply 
1s a more important 
target than the 
interest rate 
-4.  The Fed has the 
capacit:~  to ac~liievs 
a  const,3nt  growth rate 
of the money supply if 
~t  s3  desires 
5.  The Fed should be 
instructed to increase 
the lnoney supply at a 
constant rate.  14  25 
1.  Inflation is primarily 
a monetary phenomenon  42  32 
2.  Fiscal policy has 
a significant 
stimulative impact 
in a less than,  fully- 
employed economy 
3. The money supply 
is a more impclrtant 
target than th.e 
interest rate 
61  13  3  1  54 
C -  Various countriesb 
4.  The central bank has 
the capacity to achieve 
a constant rate of growth 
of the money supply if it 
so desires.  31  40 5.  The central banks should 
be instructed to increase 
the money supply at a fixed 
rate  14  2  9  55 
A denotes "generally  agree" 
B denotes "agree  with provisionsu 
C denotes "generally disagreeu. 
Note: Summations do not a1wa.y~  t~tal  100% presumably due to 
nonresponses. 
a.  Study published in 1988. 
5.  .Austria,  France,  Germany (FRG), U.S. Switzerland. The study was 
published in 1984. 
Source:;: Kearl et al. (1979)  ; Frey, et al.  (1984)  ;  Alstori et al. 1  15iib) 
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